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I don't want to be a citizen  




This paper argues that much writing about media and citizenship tends to rely on a set 
of realist or structuralist assumptions about what constitutes a state, a citizen, and 
politics. Because of these assumptions, other forms of social organisation that could 
reasonably be described as nations, and other forms of social engagement that could 
be called citizenship, are excluded from consideration. One effect of this blindness is 
that certain identities, and the cultural formations associated with them, continue to be 
overvalued as more real and important than others. Areas of culture that are 
traditionally white, masculine, middle-class and heterosexual remain central in 
debates; while the political processes of citizens of, for example, a Queer nation, 
continue to be either ignored, or devalued as being somehow trivial, unimportant, or 
less real. The paper demonstrates that this need not be the case; that the language of 
nation and citizenship can reasonably be expanded to include these other forms of 
social organisation; and that when such a conceptual move is made, we can find ways 
of describing contemporary culture that attempt to understand the public-sphere 
functions of the media without falling back into traditional prejudices against 
feminised, queer, working class or non-white forms of culture. 
 
I 
A number of axioms are common in academic writing about media and citizenship: 
• Citizenship is being degraded 
• Because people aren't watching enough public service broadcasting 
• And turning instead to commercial and commodified media 
• And one cannot be a citizen and a consumer at the same time 
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 (see, for example, Knight, 1989; Sholle, 1993; Woods, 1995: 42; Seidman, 1997: 
197; Gipsrud, 1999; Murdock, 1999; Giroux, 2000: 34, 41) 
This article sets out to refuse all of these axioms, and to explain why they can be 
misleading for writers interested in how public spheres function. It does this by means 
of a case study: how do Queer citizens engage in a Queer public sphere? 
 
II 
Three simple points: 
i) Citizenship is not necessarily linked to a state 
T H Marshall defines the existence of citizenship in terms that do not demand the 
existence of a state (although it is usually used to describe only such relationships): 
Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. 
All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with 
which the status is endowed. There is no universal principle that determines 
what those rights and duties shall be, but societies in which citizenship is a 
developing institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against which 
achievement can be measured towards which aspiration can be directed 
(Marshall, 1950: 29)  
Given Marshall's important status in political theory (and the fact that he is so often 
challenged supports rather than subverts this fact), it is useful to have his 
poststructuralist axiom at the heart of citizenship theory: citizenship is whatever a 
culture decides it will be. Also note that Marshall, in this definition, does not require 
the presence of a state in order to think of a relationship as one of 'citizenship'. It is a 
relationship with a 'community'; a 'society'.  
It might help if we think of citizenship as involving a relationship with a nation rather 
than with a state. Recent work in political theory has emphasised the fact that nations 
can exist separately from states (Gottlieb, 1994; Held, 1996; Keating, 1996, 2000; 
Hardt and Negri, 2000). Historical accounts point out that the nation-state, although 
currently the predominant form of political and social organisation, has not always 
been so (commentators often cite as the moment of its birth the French Revolution; 
Torpey, 2000: 20), nor has it ever been universal (Dolivet, 1946: 4; Torpey, 2000: 72, 
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127). When the corollary of the 'state' is removed from 'nation-state', the remaining 
nation can be described as a ‘cultural artefact’ (Anderson, 1991: 4). ‘an imagined 
political community – imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign’ (6).  
A nation is a body of people who see part at least of their identity in terms of a 
single communal identity with some considerable historical continuity of union, 
with major elements of common culture, and with a sense of geographical 
location at least for a good part of those who make up the nation … all of these 
criteria may be false in any set of examples … nations can exist despite 
extensive dispersion geographically - there are very many Chinese outside of 
China … whilst Poland continued to exist as a nation throughout the several 
lengthy periods when it had not official political existence on any map of 
Europe.… (Robertson, 1985: 223) 
Nations do not need to have land - an important starting point for this argument, as a 
recognition of the existence of deterritorialised nations allows us to think about 
nations apart from states. Indeed, the recognition of the existence of such 
deterritorialised nations has been an important part of recent political philosophy. But 
let us still accept that a nation must have some form of sovereignty. But this does not 
demand the presence of a state either. Let us take the case of a possible Queer nation. 
A nation must be recognised as being, to some degree, independent in its self-
management. But, as Keating points out (2000), nation-states have always - and 
nowadays more than ever do so with the increasing importance of supranational 
constructs such as Europe - existed as part of stacked hierarchies of legislation and 
control. Queer nations are not free of levels of sovereignty above them: but neither is 
Scotland in the United Kingdom; and neither is the United Kingdom in Europe. But at 
the level of governing itself, a Queer nation is undoubtedly sovereign. Henry 
Reynolds' Aboriginal Sovereignty: Three Nations, One Australia is one of the most 
concerted attempts to think through the advantages of conferring nation status on 
groups within a state; and the obstacles that must be addressed in order to make this 
argument convincing (Reynolds, 1996). In the course of this argument, he points out 
that under international law applicable at the time of Australia's settlement, one 
important aspect of judging nationhood was the degree to which a group of people 
demonstrated: 'adherence to laws and customs of a community' (10, 17, 27, 31-37; see 
also Latham, 2001: 7). Of course, those laws and customs aren't always visible to 
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those of other cultures. Reynolds points out that a British court ruling - that we would 
now recognise as being ethnocentric in the extreme - denied that Indigenous 
Australian culture had any laws or customs, claiming that 'aborigines [sic] never have 
been in possession of any code of laws intelligible to a civilized people' (Reynolds, 
1996: 71).  
The Queer community undoubtedly has laws and customs. Although they may not be 
obvious to 'civilized people'2, they are very clear to those living within the nation. We 
know this mainly because of the publications of dissenters such as Mark Simpson, 
whose Anti-Gay (1996) is a collection of articles raging against the rules and customs 
that govern the Queer nation and constrict the expression and conduct of gay men and 
lesbians.  
In this collection, Mark Simpson himself, for example, explores the 'absolute dut[ies]' 
of being gay; Jo Eadie attacks 'the dictates of gay and lesbian pride' (Eadie, 1996: 68); 
Toby Manning worries about how 'gay cuture … patrols the representation of 
homosexuals' (Manning, 1996: 101); Suzanne Patterson and Anne-Marie Le Blé 
discuss the fact that not to accept lesbian standards of personal comportment is to be 
seen as a 'traitor' (Patterson and Le Blé, 1996: 118); and La Bruce and Belverio note 
the 'gay artillery fire of reverse moralism' that such traitors should expect (La Bruce 
and Belverio, 1996: 156). These writers describe the patrolling of Queers in order to 
ensure their compliance with duties and dictates, and with traitors facing artillery fire. 
The customs and laws of a nation indeed.  
These duties - the rights and responsibilities of Queer Citizenship - are mapped out by 
the Simpson collection. They include an ethics of personal behaviour - albeit one 
based around 'hedonism' (Simpson, 1996c: 5): one must 'feel-good-or-else' (Simpson, 
1996b: xv); and 'saying "no" to any form of indulgence [is] a denial of the truth of 
who you [are]' (Simpson 1996c: 4). They include strictures on forms of public 
comportment and correct behaviour: conformity is required in regard to 'wearing the 
same jeans, haircut and … facial expression', watching 'the same American porn 
movies … performing the same [sexual] acts … [wearing] aftershaves … [and] new 
fashion lines' (Simpson, 1995: 7) One must wear 'Calvin Klein … [and have] fully 
formed pectorals'.  … (Simpson, 1996c: 8). Citizens should be: 'hairless young men in 
nipple-hugging white T-shirts' (Weir, 1996: 30); '[i]f gay men ruled America there 
would be tax credits for joining a gym' (Weir, 1996: 30). There are also requirements 
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for ceremonial duties, going to 'the Pride Parade' and discos (Simpson, 1996c: 8). A 
political imagination is required, with a commitment to a vision of: 'turning the whole 
world into a gay disco … [and awaiting] the Coming of the Kingdom of Kylie …' 
(Simpson, 1996c: 10). Other dissenters have even suggested that the rights and 
responsibilities of a 'monolithic' Queer nation expand across the globe - a truly post-
national Nation (Manalansan IV, 1995:  432; see also Frank Mort, quoted in Sinfield, 
1998: 30).  
One writer in the collection goes on to attack: 'the relentless celebration of all 
businesses, activities and individuals designated as gay, regardless of worth, merit or 
talent' (Manning, 1996: 103). Replacing the word 'gay' with 'Australian' may remind 
some readers of the experience of living in Australia, and make clear the very 
nationalistic nature of such sentiments.  
Obviously the media - both mainstream and explicitly Queer - have a huge part to 
play in the formation of consensus about the laws and customs of the community. 
Although, as I have argued elsewhere, the Queer nation retains a set of physical 
gathering spaces reminiscent of the classical forum or agora (see McKee, 1997), the 
importance of Queer newspapers and magazines in this process must not be 
underestimated. Many of the dissenters in the Simpson collection identify the 'trivial' 
or sex-obsessed Queer press as a major part of the dissolution facing the Queer nation 
(see Chris Woods below). 
My position, then, is that we can think of citizens and nations outside of relationships 
with the state. Some writers, of course, would disagree with this proposition - or, at 
the very least, find it deeply problematic. Why would I want to appropriate the 
language of political philosophy in this way? Doesn't that mean that anything goes, 
that citizenship is limitless, that any interpersonal relation can be included within the 
term? 
My reasons for wanting to lay such a claim to the term 'citizenship' lie in my belief in 
the importance of language. A 'Queer nation' is not the same thing as a 'Queer 
community', even if the people and culture described by the terms are the same. John 
Hartley and I have recently argued that it is not accidental that Indigenous leaders in 
Australia are rarely allowed the title 'politician' in public discourse. Our research 
found that other terms were favoured by news coverage: 'protestor', 'rebel', 'radical', 
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'activist' or even 'warrior' (Hartley and McKee, 2000: 289). Such terms, we argued, 
delegitimise Indigenous politicians. Differences between them become 'schisms' or 
'splits': such language would never be used of white politicians, of whom absolute 
agreement on all issues is expected. 
I would argue that a similar argument can be made for the granting of the terms 
'nation' and 'citizenship' (precisely as Henry Reynolds, above, has argued in relation to 
Indigenous nations in Australia). Media and cultural studies, even as they have 
recognised the importance of culture and language in shaping our view of the world, 
have tended to retain a series of terms which are granted the status of being 'real', 
outside of discourse - and therefore, ontologically, of primary importance. The pre-
eminent of these terms in cultural studies, as Mark Gibson has demonstrated, is 
'power' (Gibson, 2001). In media studies, 'politics' has served a similar purpose. The 
state, and its relations with citizens, are seen to be the 'reality' against which media 
representations can be judged. My central point in this paper is that it is precisely for 
this reason that it is so important to broaden the reach of the terms 'nation' and 
'citizenship': that is, fully to accept Marshall's own poststructuralist gambit. As I argue 
below, for many Queer citizens in liberal countries, the management of behaviour in 
relation to the Queer nation in which they live is actually more 'real' than that which 
occurs in relation to the state.  
The charge that broadening the use of the term leads to a limitless conception of 
citizenship is a familiar furphy - the same one that is repeated against any 
poststructuralist argument: 'does that mean that anything goes?'. As I have argued at 
length elsewhere (see McKee, 2001) to deny that concepts have absolute or 
transcendent meanings is not the same thing as saying that anything goes; rather it is 
the prelude to continuing work by which we map out the meanings that terms 
historically take on, in the actual moments of their usage. Even without ontological 
certainty about meaning, consensus continues to be reached about making sense of the 
world - differently across different communities, but still with enough consistency to 
allow communication to take place. 'Queer nation' is not my invention, but a phrase 
which already has a meaning in wider culture (see Berlant and Freeman, 1993). 
Granted, my own extension of this paradigm to argue for the existence of 'Queer 
citizens' is novel; and if it fails to gain currency, it will vanish and no longer trouble 
anyone. If it is taken up, and becomes acceptable, then the terms in which we conduct 
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our debates may change slightly. This is not the same thing as saying that any aspect 
of social relations can now reasonably be described as citizenship. 
 
ii) Citizenship is not the opposite of consumption; nor is it the opposite of 
partaking in commercialised culture; nor in commodified culture 
Let us provide a taxonomy of some of the rights and responsibilities of citizenship of 
a Queer nation. 
• Taxation: for example, there is a requirement for Queer citizens to ' contribut[e] to 
AIDS charities' (Sinfield, 1998: 192). 
• Cultural observance: Queer citizens must 'attend earnest Queer movies' (Sinfield, 
1998: 192; Rich, 1999: 83); and join in the national celebration of parades and 
public holidays (Currah, 1997: 255) 
• Public health: Queer citizens must attend a gym; take recreational drugs; go to 
dance parties; and have meaningless casual sex (Crain, 1997: np; Sinfield, 1998: 
192). 
• Political participation: Queer citizens must partake in the politics of spectacle by 
shopping, dressing and living with style (Berlant and Freeman, 1993: 208.). 
Shopping and style. Some of the our more sober sociologists and political theorists 
repeatedly insist that 'citizenship' and 'consumption' are binary opposites (Woods, 
1995: 42; Seidman, 1997: 197; Sinfield, 1998: 182; Giroux, 2000: 34, 41). Such a 
position is logically incoherent, and tends to disadvantage citizens of a Queer nation.  
Many of the duties, the rights and responsibilities, of Queer citizens are strongly 
linked to commerce. Queer citizens are required not simply to vote, but to buy - 
clothes, aftershave, gym membership and music. This point is clearly made by many 
dissenters in the Queer nation; who usually condemn it in familiar Marxist terms. 
They attack commercial culture not for issues of, say, the exploitation of unskilled 
labour it might involve, so much as for its democratic impulse of levelling taste 
cultures. 'Gays are better at franchising than McDonalds', says Simpson (1996c: 6-7), 
going on to attack Ikea as a bad object - as does Manning (1996: 102). The real 
problem with commercialised gay culture, claim several writers, is that it is 'mediocre' 
(Manning, 1996: 98; La Bruce and Belverio, 1996: 153).  
 8 
All citizenship involves consumption of culture and texts, whether or not these are 
commercially circulated. Public service broadcasting does not reach citizens, for 
example, unless they 'consume' it. Sombre broadsheet newspapers are even more 
problematic - they must be commercially purchased and then consumed - yet are still 
usually regarded as part of the proper citizenship process by even the most hardened 
critics of 'commodification'. In fact, we can see that most of the writers who condemn 
'consumerism' (or commodification, or consumption, or commercialism) are not in 
fact condemning 'consumerism': for they do not condemn all commercial 
consumption. Rather, it is 'mediocre' and standardised ('franchis[ed]') popular forms 
of culture which are consistently attacked. Chris Woods, for example, arguing that 
Queer culture is not political (does not produce citizens) draws the distinction thus:  
The commodification of homosexuality has less to do with the politics of 
liberation or community than with the cynical creation and maintenance of a 
gullible niche market … Sensing that many gay men had little interest in 
traditional politics of the gay press, the weekly paper Boyz was launched with its 
Smash Hits style vacuity … the worthier end [of the gay press] - Capital Gay, 
Gay Times, The Pink Paper, was elbowed aside by the "lifestyle" oriented Boyz, 
Attitude, QX, APN and SheBang. (Woods, 1995: 41, 42, 43) 
It is not commercialism per se that offends most of these writers: it is the fact that 
people choose the wrong kind of commodified culture (Boyz rather than Capital Gay). 
The viciousness of writers such as Woods - insisting that these kinds of text do not do 
politics, are not citizenship, are only about consumption - claims to be aimed at an 
economic system, but ultimately ends up as explicit hatred for, and dismissal of, 
fellow citizens. Their tastes and pleasures are trivial, vacuous - and not, they say, 
political. 
I refuse the citizen/consumer binary for this reason: it is about aesthetics rather than 
being a useful distinction between political and non-political forms of culture. In 
studying the Queer nation we have to move away from the insistence of many writers 
that discussions of the public sphere in relation to the media are necessarily about 
public service broadcasting - about, ultimately, relations to the state (for the most 
developed version of this argument in cultural studies, see Hartley, 1992, 1996, 1999). 
Queer citizens are - in their capacity as Queer citizens, and not any of the other 
nationalities to which they might also belong - not citizens of a state.  
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This, of course, is where the title of this article comes in. If citizenship is restricted to 
a narrow definition of a relationship to the state and the state only, then what about 
those of us for whom the state is not very important: who don't care much about party 
politics, who are only impinged upon by the state when we must pay taxes or meet the 
police? What about those of us who are involved, in all kinds of ways, with other 
forms of governance that are not of the state's making (the detailed rules, laws and 
customs of the Queer nation detailed above, for example?). What if we are involved in 
a commercially provided public sphere that functions to form a Queer public opinion 
and to intervene in the governance of that Queer nation? 
This is why, as I argued above, it is important to lay claim to the term 'citizenship' for 
members of a Queer nation, rather than accepting that we are 'only' involved in 
identity politics, or merely a community. According to the strict definition of 
citizenship, we exist only as a lack. We are 'not citizens' - or perhaps more accurately 
and with an even more derogatory thrust, we are 'not good citizens'. Our lack of 
engagement with the state appears as an absence, apathy, laziness, a failing. But what 
if we are still engaged with public spheres, with governance, with rules and customs 
in other spheres - can this not be recognised as citizenship? If these rules and customs 
and laws impinge more on our lives than those of the state, can we not recognise their 
importance as the workings of the nation to which we belong as citizens? The 
insistence that only the state has citizens or a public sphere strikes me as part of the 
same old game that insisted that women did not belong in public (even when in 
public) or doing politics (even when involved in forms of governance). Traditional 
state-based politics is still by and large the realm of white, middle-aged, middle-class, 
educated men (and some women). And that, of course, is real citizenship. Insisting on 
such a confluence strikes me as more than a coincidence - and as more than slightly 
arrogant. 
 
iii) The public sphere does not only consist of public service broadcasting 
We know that the Queer Public Sphere does not include much material from public 
broadcasting. For example, the 'Couch Potato' television guide in the Queer 
newspaper Westside Observer, which maps out a shared culture - a common public 
sphere - for Queer citizens, shows little interest in the ABC and SBS (three references 
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in one issue, for example to the former, none to the latter), and rather directs Queer 
viewers to the material presented by commercial channels (with dozens of references 
to programmes provided on these channels in a single issue - Pitts, 1996: 19). From 
my own experience of the media, this does not surprise me. Notwithstanding the 
moments at which the ABC has provided innovative representations of Queerdom (the 
appearance of Queer couples on the documentary series Chequerboard, the 
broadcasting of the Mardi Gras from 1994), commercial television has provided at 
least as many innovations (Don Finlayson in Number 96 predated the outing of GP's 
doctor by twenty three years); and remains more important for the Queer public 
sphere.  
Thus, taking the public sphere to be a: 'domain of our social life in which such a thing 
as public opinion can  be formed … … deal[ing] with matters of general interest 
without being subject to coercion …' (Habermas, 1997: 105), and noting that public 
spheres serve nations and they address citizens (Livingstone and Lunt, 1994: 9), we 
are now in a position to disagree with the mantra that continues to buzz in the 
background. No, citizenship is not being degraded. Yes, people choose to watch 
'trivial' and 'popular' and 'accessible' television rather than much public service 
broadcasting. But this implies no reduction in citizenship, for other forms of national 
identity and citizenship than simply those associated with the nation-state are present 
and important. Issues of concern to the general populous of (say) the Queer nation are 
being worked out in public spheres which bear little relation to the public 
broadcasting which these writers wish to impose on the populaces of their countries.  
 
III 
This paper has established a theoretical position from which one can claim to be a 
citizen, to belong to a nation, partake in a public sphere, and show little interest in 
state-run public broadcasting. Other nations (for example, a Queer nation) exist. The 
sober sociologists are wrong. Really of course, I should now go on to explore the 
ways in which this Queer Public Sphere functions - the difference, for example, 
between the rational argument undertaken by Andrew Sullivan in his book Virtually 
Normal (1996) as he argues for gay marriage, contrasted with the multiple arguments 
by rhetoric, narrative, image and sex that Mike Donner's gay porn video Happily Ever 
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After (1996) employs to make similar points. But sadly, 3000 words are gone (and 
more). There is barely space to include a revised set of axioms, ones that I think are 
useful for researchers who want to approach questions of media and citizenship from 
a more inclusive perspective (see Hartley, 1999). So here they are: 
• Citizenship is being improved 
• Because people are partaking in a number of public spheres 
• Which are common, voluntary and overlapping 
• And using commercial and public media 
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1 Thanks to Eleanor Rennie for useful discussion during the evolution of the paper, 
and for the idea of 'dissent'. 
2 NB. This is meant ironically 
